.
The essence of American democracy is compromise. Legislation, therefore, can be understood as an attempt to find a middle ground and respond to competing interests. As a result, one rarely sees major disjunctions in terms of policy initiatives. Political change tends to be more incremental. Even major pieces of legislation that might be characterized as breaks with the past are often rooted in past programs or shaped in response to existing political interests. If policymakers did not compromise, it would be nearly impossible to assure passage and implementation of any programs given the structure of government.
What makes the legislative history of 1995 so unique is that the Republicans in the House of Representatives attempted to move a political agenda based on majority rule as opposed to compromise. In the case of health care, this meant ending the entitlements of Medicare and Medicaid. Whether Speaker of the House Newt Gingrich did not understand the rules of the game, or whether he felt he had the power to prevail over the checks put into the system to prevent what James Madison called the tyranny of the majority over the minority is unclear. However, David Smith documents these efforts to reform Medicare and Medicaid, starting with the 104 th Congress, in, Entitlement Politics: Medicare and Medicaid 1995-2001.
The 104 th Congress began in 1995, the midyear of President Bill Clinton's first term, and was marked by a Republican takeover of the House and the Senate and passage of the ''Con-tract with America.'' With the overall goal of limiting the size of government and reducing the deficit, the tools available to Republicans were budget and tax cuts. In the case of Medicare and Medicaid, the Republican agenda called for ending the entitlement and the open-ended nature of both programs. Republican lawmakers used the budget reconciliation process to cut and restructure these programs because it bypassed committee procedures and was not open for debate and vote. Smith documents in great detail the political process that led to passage of the Balanced Budget Act of 1995, a presidential veto, and the shutdown of government for 21 days.
The following year, Congress was at a standstill on Medicare and Medicaid reform as Republicans reconsidered how to move on their political agenda, and both parties focused on the upcoming presidential election. Congress returned to the question of health care reform at the beginning of 1997. Again in great detail, Smith outlines the process by which Republicans and Democrats finally achieved a compromise. The Balanced Budget Act of 1997 made concessions to both parties. For Republicans, a competitive approach was taken to Medicare. The act incorporated medical savings accounts and expanded Medicare's managed care program, Medicaid1 Choice. For Democrats who believed in the efficiency of Medicare, the act maintained the benefits structure while seeking greater savings through price regulation and a program of quality assurance.
In 1997, the Balanced Budget Act was considered a major reform of both Medicare and Medicaid. As implemented, however, the program had less of an impact than originally thought. Smith attributes this to the fact that Congress avoided the structural problems underlying both programs. The Balanced Budget Act did not address the growing percentage of people eligible for Medicare benefits or the technological advances increasing the volume and cost of care. In addition, the legislation did not respond to the strain that Medicaid places on state budgets by the benefits provided to the disabled and chronically ill. Although the pressures to deal with these problems lessened-given a strong economy, plus a government surplus and what appeared to be better control over health care costs-they have re-emerged. It is Smith's contention that the solution will be found only in compromise. It may be frustrating, but given our political system there is no other way to resolve the problems that lie beneath these programs.
Entitlement Politics provides a detailed study of how the political process was used to seek a majority position; how it was used to prevent realization of that solution; and how it ultimately was used to achieve a compromise. The book is useful for policy analysts and researchers who are interested in a richer understanding of the ever-evolving Medicare and Medicaid programs. For policymakers, it can be viewed as a rich case study of the political process. For those with more general interests in health care policy, the level of detail about the political maneuvering undermines the critical political argument about the workings of compromise and the future of health care reform. Arnold Birenbaum has written a far-ranging, thought-provoking book about recent changes in the U.S. health care system and how they have affected the medical profession specifically. Birenbaum tracks and analyzes physicians as a profession-and not just an interest group-and begins his engaging treatment with an introduction to the study of the professions in general.
It is a strength of Wounded Profession that Birenbaum touches on as much history as he does, even if it is nearly always from the physician's perspective. Still, he is not blind to the ways in which this profession's wounds are selfinflicted. Most of the book is really prologue to Birenbaum's final chapters, where he explores and advocates for medicine's return to appropriate professional status.
Wounded Profession also has some weaknesses. There are a few quibbles: for example, most economists find that the rising costs of worker health benefits have come out of wage increases rather than U.S. manufacturing competitiveness (p. 11). More seriously, the book includes some statements that are questionably framed so as to be misleading. The history of Medicare, for example, hardly suggests that its enactment posed a threat to physician autonomy (p. 111). Birenbaum states that ''students of the profession'' think so, but there is no citation for these students; in fact, Medicare for many years protected itself politically by allowing physicians to control what was provided (''medically necessary'') and at what price (''usual and customary''). Again, although Birenbaum reports the poor participation rate of managed care organizations in the National Practitioner Data Bank (p. 111), he does not provide a measure of how well the medical profession policed its errant members before managed care. Similarly, he critiques managed care's disinterest in public health (p. 112) without reference to the medical profession's long-term estrangement from public health and the former's efforts to ensure that health care dollars come overwhelmingly to medical care.
The book is selective in its treatment of the Oregon Health Plan, which is meant to be an example of a ''civic community,'' itself a possibility for professional reform (p. 124). Birenbaum does not caution that the effectiveness criteria used by the plan to prioritize health services proved intensely problematic and that the first few listings of these services were nonsense. Furthermore, although Birenbaum considers the Oregon experience an example of partnering across the community, the plan's benefit cuts were applied only to Medicaid services to poor
